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Article 11

THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE-EVISCERATION
OF UNION MEMBER RIGHTS
I. Introduction
After more than eighty years of state courts adjudicating internal union
disputes, the United States Supreme Court has effectively denied a union member recourse to litigation in his state jurisdiction and now requires him to take
his dispute with his union to the National Labor Relations Board.' The case
used to severely limit the remedies of individual union members is Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge.2 The Lockridge decision puts new vitality into the
preemption doctrine which the court firmly established in San Diego Unions u.
Garmon.' Essentially the preemption doctrine means that when conduct is
"arguably" protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Acte the
"States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of
the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."' Prior to the Lockridge decision, the leading case
concerning state jurisdiction over disputes between members and their union
was InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Gonzales.0 Gonzales held that
the protection of union members in their contractual rights with the union was
not undertaken by federal law and that state jurisdiction was not precluded by
the fact that the union's conduct might also involve an unfair labor practice or
because of the remote possibility of conflict with the enforcement of national
labor policy by the National Labor Relations Board.7
Mr. Justice Douglas, who had joined Chief Justice Warren's dissent in
Gonzales, dissented in Lockridge. After stressing the inequities of the Lockridge
situation, he remarked: "While I joined the dissent in Gonzales, experience
under Garmon convinces me that we should not apply its rule to the grievances
of individual employees against a union." 8 It is the intent of this article to examine the harsh effects of the application of the preemption doctrine to Lockridgetype disputes, to analyze the broad discretion of the National Labor Relations
Board's General Counsel and to offer some suggestions for needed changes in the
National Labor Relations Act.
I. History of the Dispute
With the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress envisioned a policy of national uniformity in labor relations and estab1 For cases dealing with state adjudication of internal union disputes, see People ex reL
Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101, 23 N.E. 129 (1889) (expulsion);
Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891) (suspension of local).
2 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
3 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
4 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-68 (1964).
5 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
6 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
7 Id.
8 403 U.S. at 302 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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lished the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to guarantee uniformity of
the Act's application. In Garmon the Supreme Court adopted a principle of
broad preemption in order to assure uniform application of the national labor
laws. Although Garmon has brought relative stability to the preemption problem,
some of its consequences have been open to much criticism.' The keystone of
Garmon is whether or not an activity is "arguably" subject to section 7 or section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.'" Garmon held that states could
not act in any case involving conduct "arguably subject" to sections 7 or 8, because, to take jurisdiction, the state court would first have to interpret those
sections to find whether or not the activity was subject to federal regulation."
The Court's reasoning was that the regulatory scheme established by Congress
requires that only the NLRB can make an initial determination whether an
activity is governed by sections 7 or 8.12 However, under Garmon, when the
Board refuses to assert its jurisdiction, the state does not have the power to act.'
In Garmon, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction in a peaceful picketing
dispute and the California court then asserted jurisdiction and granted an injunction and awarded damages. The Supreme Court held that the state could not
assert its jurisdiction, because the activity was "arguably" subject to sections 7
and 8, even though the Board declined jurisdiction for policy reasons. The decision again raised the question of the existence of a "no-man's land"-which
first became apparent in the notorious Guss opinion. 4 In order to remedy the
"no-man's land" problem, Congress in 1959 amended the NLRA to permit the
states to assert jurisdiction in labor disputes over which the Board so declines.'
It must be noted that the language of this amendment is addressed to situations
in which the Board declines to assert jurisdiction because, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor disputes on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. There is no provision for
permitting state jurisdiction where the Board refuses to assert jurisdiction for
"policy reasons," as where the General Counsel refuses to issue a complaint because he is not convinced of the merits of the case. In such situations the
Garmon principle "that the failure of the Board to define the legal significance
under the Act of a particular activity does not give the states the power to act,"'"
appears to apply. Thus, there still remains the problem of the "no-man's land".
9 See, e.g., Gould, Union OrganizationalRights and the Concept of "Quasi Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. Rzv. 505 (1965); Note, State Regulation of Unprotected Union Activity:
Bypassing the "Arguably Subject" Test with NLRB Advisory Opinions, 70 YALE L.J. 441
(1961).
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1964).
11 359 U.S. at 245.
12 Id. at 244-45.
13 Id. at 246.
14 In Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957), the Supreme Court held
that a state court was barred from asserting jurisdiction against federally protected conduct,
even though the NLRB, in its discretion, refused to assert jurisdiction. The case established
the existence of a "no man's land" in the regulation of concerted employee activity.
15 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c) (2), amending 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1964), provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or
the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over which
the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
16 359 U.S. at 246.
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It is unclear what the Congressional intent was in regard to this situation, but
apparently the case is barred from either the federal or state courts.1 7
Initially the Court carved out two exceptions to the Garmon doctrine:
Where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern of the Labor
Management Relations Act.... Or where the regulated conduct touche[s]
interest so deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility that, in the
absence of compelling Congressional direction, we [can] not infer that Congress [has] deprived the states of the power to act.'8
The Court cited Gonzales as an example of the first exception. 9 Gonzales was
decided a year before Garmon but its rationale was not rejected by Garmon. In
Gonzales the Court demonstrated its concern for providing a remedy for the
individual union member and recognized that:
...to preclude a state court from exerting its traditional jurisdiction to
determine and enforce the rights of union membership would in many cases
leave an unjustly ousted member without remedy for the restoration of his
important union rights.2 0
However, the Gonzales exception was limited and distinguished in 1963
when the Court decided Plumbers' Union v. Borden2 and Iron Workers v.
Perko.2 2 In Borden, a member of a local plumbers' union was refused a job because the local business agent of the union refused to give him a job reference.
Borden brought suit in the Texas state court seeking damages for the union's
refusal to give a reference and alleging that the local's action constituted a willful, malicious and discriminatory violation of his right to contract for employment, and a breach of an implicit promise in the union membership arrangement
not to discriminate unfairly or deny any member the right to work. The union
challenged the state court jurisdiction on the grounds that the subject matter
of the suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Supreme
Court held that the union's conduct was "arguably" protected or prohibited by
sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, and that state court
jurisdiction must yield to the NLRB in accordance with the Garmon doctrine.
The Court distinguished Gonzales on the grounds that the Gonzales suit focused
on internal union matters and "that the principal relief sought was restoration
of union membership rights."2 The Court further noted that the thrust of
Borden's suit "focused principally, if not entirely, on the union's actions with
respect to Borden's efforts to obtain employment." 24 In Perko, a union member
brought a suit in the Ohio state court against his union local, alleging that he
had been employed as a foreman when the union conspired to deprive him of
17 See generally Day v. Northwest Division 1055, 238 Ore. 624, 389 P.2d 42 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878 (1964).
18 359 U.S. at 243-44.
19 Id.
20 356 U.S. at 620.
21 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
22 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
23 373 U.S. at 697.
24 Id.
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the right to work as a foreman and forced the company to discharge him as a
foreman and that the union had prevented him from obtaining work. Once
again, the Court, applying the Garmon doctrine, held that the state must yield
its jurisdiction because the crux of the action was not directed to internal union
affairs.
The result of Borden and Perko was to severely limit the Gonzales-type
exception to Garmon. This limitation can have the effect of leaving an individual
union member without a remedy. The Court was provided with an opportunity
to re-evaluate the Gonzales-type exception when it granted certiorari in Lockridge, but the results of that re-evaluation were disappointing.
III. The Lockridge Case
Lockridge represents a further evisceration of Gonzales and demonstrates
the squeeze the preemption doctrine has placed on union members. Lockridge
was discharged from his employment on the ground that he had forfeited his
good standing membership in his union because of a dues arrearage of one month
and was therefore subject to dismissal under a union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement which made union membership a condition of continued employment. He brought suit in the Idaho state court against his union
and employer, who was later dropped as a party, charging that the union acted
wrongfully, deprived him of his employment and that his suspension was in
violation of the union's constitution and bylaws which constituted a contract
under Idaho law.25 Lockridge was awarded $32,678.56 as actual damages for
the loss of his employment.
In affirming the judgement, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the union
...did most certainly violate section 8(b) (2) and probably caused the
employer to violate section 8(a) (3), all of which constitute unfair labor
practices, all of which are subject to the exclusive cognizance of the NLRB
and are not subject to adjustment by, or interference with, Idaho courts. 26
Nevertheless, the Idaho court asserted jurisdiction because the union "did com'2
mit a breach of the contract between itself and W. P. Lockridge, a member.
The court's rationale was that Lockridge was attempting to regain his membership and thus the suit was focused on purely internal union matters and "the
only relationship his employment has to this case is a means by which damages
can be computed. '28 The court held that the dispute was governed by Gonzales
rather than Borden or Perko. In citing Gonzales, the court noted "the purpose
for which we exercise jurisdiction is to avoid leaving 'an unjustly ousted member
without remedy for the restoration of important union rights.' "2 Borden and
Perko were distinguished on the grounds that in those cases the union members
25 Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of S.,E.R. & M.C. Emp., 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d
719 (1969).
26 Id. at 299, 460 P.2d at 724-25.
27 Id. at 300, 460 P.2d at 725.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 301, 460 P.2d at 725-26.
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never sought reinstatement in the union and that "they had never been denied
their membership."3 "
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Idaho Supreme Court,
held that the repsondent's complaint involved a matter that was "arguably" protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the National Labor Relations
Act and thus the state court was preempted from asserting jurisdiction under
the Garmon doctrine."' It was emphasized that the proper focus of concern for
determining whether a suit falls within the preemption doctrine is the conduct
sought to be regulated rather than the theory upon which the case is tried in the
state court. 2 Moreover, the Court held the suit was governed by Borden and
Perko rather than Gonzales. The Court concluded that Lackridge did not fall
within the "peripheral concern" exception of Gonzales because the case turned
on the construction of the applicable union security clause as to which federal
concern was pervasive." Lockridge certainly reaffirms the rationale of Borden
and Perko and leaves no doubt that the preemption doctrine is still a very viable
one. Where "the crux of [an] action . . . concern[s] alleged interference with
the plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations and [is] not directed
to internal union matters," 4 state jurisdiction must yield.
The consequences of Lockridge can be particularly harsh for the individual
union member. An examination of the National Labor Relations Board Procedures sheds additional light on the problem. The Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) separates the prosecutory and adjudicatory functions of the Board,
5
by placing the former under the exclusive direction of the General Counsel.
Under section 10(b) of the Act, an aggrieved party has six months within which
to file an unfair labor practice charge. 6 When an unfair labor practice charge
has been filed and answered by the party charged, a regional office field examiner
3
conducts an informal investigation of the alleged facts of the dispute. After
the investigation, the Regional Director must decide if there is sufficient evidence
to substantiate the charge.3 He can refuse to issue a complaint if he finds that
there is insufficient evidence of the facts alleged, or that the facts alleged do not
constitute a violation of the Act. 9 The Regional Director will request the complainant to withdraw his charge, but if it is not withdrawn, then he will dismiss
it." The dismissal may be appealed within ten days to the General Counsel,
whose decision is final." If the General Counsel declines to issue a complaint,
2
The
it is generally believed that the charging party has no further recourse.
30 Id. at 303, 460 P.2d at 728.
31 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).

32 Id. at 292.
33 Id. at 296.

34 Id. at 295-296.
35 See Labor Management Relations Act § 3 (d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1964).
36 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1964).
37

29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1971).

41

Id. at § 101.6, 102.19.

38 Id. at § 101.5.
39 Id. at § 101.6.
40 Id.

42 For cases that have held the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is final

and unreviewable, see United Electrical Contractor's Ass'n v. Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 758,
aff'd per curiam, 366 F.2d. 767 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Retail
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Supreme Court has never ruled on the reviewability of the General Counsel's
refusal to issue a complaint.43 The independent authority of the General Counsel in issuing complaints has been criticized,44 but survived Congressional intent
to repeal it in 1950.45 Even if the decision not to issue complaints was reviewable,
it would not be a satisfactory remedy because of the backlog of unfair labor
practice cases before the Board.4
Justice Douglas made the following remarks concerning the backlog of
the Board and the plight of the individual:
When we hold that a grievance is 'arguably' within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board and remit the individual employee to
the Board for remedial relief, we impose a great hardship on him, especially
where he is a lone individual not financed out of such a lush treasury. I
would allow respondent recourse to litigation in his home tribunal and not
require him to resort to an elusive remedy
in distant and remote Washing47
ton, D.C. which takes money to reach.
He further remarked:
From the viewpoint of an aggrieved employee, there is not a trace of
equity in this long-drawn, expensive remedy. If he musters the resources to

Store Employees Union Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Amal. Ass'n
of Street & El. Ry. Emp. v. Ordman, 320 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Wellington Mill
Division, West Point Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d. 579, 590 (4th Cir. 1964).
43 See Office Employees v. Labor Board, 353 U.S. 313 (1957), where the Court held
that the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction, as to a class, when acting as employers was
contrary to the intent of Congress, was arbitrary, and beyond the Board's power. However,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, refused to accept this case as authority for review
of the General Counsel's discretion, in Division 1267. Amal. Ass'n of Street & El. Ry. Emp.
v. Ordman, -320 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
44 COMMISSON ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 139-41 (1949); Hearings on H. Res.
512 and H. Res. 516 Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 107 (1950).
45 See REORGANIZATION PLAN 12 OF 1950, H. R. DOc. No. 516, 81st Cong. 2d Sess.
(1950).
46 For the backlog of cases before the Board, see THiRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1970. Table 1 A, p.
155, shows the following number of unfair labor practice cases:
Pending July 1, 1969 ...........................................................
17,152
Received fiscal 1970............................................................
13,601
On docket fiscal 1970...........................................................
18,756
Closed fiscal 1970 ..............................................................
12,815
Pending June 30, 1970 .................................... 5,941
Table 8, p. 169 shows how 19,851 unfair labor practice cases in fiscal 1970
were closed.
Before issuance of complaint ............................... ...
17,152
After issuance of complaint, before opening of hearing ..................................
1,188
After hearing opened, before issuance of trial examiner's decision ................
181
After trial examiner's decision, before issuance of Board decision ................
25
After Board order adopting trial examiner's decision in absence of exceptions
201
After Board decision, before circuit court decree ......................................
619
After circuit court decree, before Supreme Court action ................................
421
After Supreme Court action ........... ...............
64
The chart on p. 4 reveals the following concerning the above statistics:
29.8% were dismissed before complaint.
26.3% were settled and adjusted.
36.2% were withdrawn before complaint.
5.5% of cases in which the Board orders were issued.
47 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 303 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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exhaust the administrative remedy, the chances are that he, too, will be
exhausted. If the General Counsel issues a complaint, then he stands in line
for some time waiting for the Board's decision. If the General Counsel refuses to act, then the employee is absolutely without remedy.48
IV. The Need for a Change
The national labor policy of the United States is an embodiment of the
policies and provisions of the major federal labor laws. Under the subject of
labor relations, there are essentially two broad categories of relationships among
employers, labor unions and union members. The first, labor-management relations, concerns the relationship between employers and employee who have
chosen to be represented by a union. The second, union-member relations, encompasses the relationship between the union and its members. The thrust of
the first national labor laws was primarily job-related and not confined to unionmember relations. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA.) had as one of
its primary objectives the promotion of industrial peace.49 The Act recognized
the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers and acknowledged the right of employees to self-organization, to engage in collective
bargaining through their own choosing or to refrain from any of the activities
enumerated in the Act. It further defined and prohibited certain unfair labor
practices by employers in order to assure protection of employee rights. Congress
realized that industrial strife was also caused by undesirable practices on the part
of labor unions as well as employers and amended the National Labor Relations
Act in 1947 to provide protection to employers and additional protection to employees.5" In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress established
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as a centralized administrative
agency entrusted with the administration of a uniform national labor policy.51
In order to alleviate conflicts between the national policy and state laws and to
assure uniformity of enforcement, the Supreme Court devised a broad preemption doctrine. This doctrine was first enunciated in Garner v. Teamsters
Union52 and further elaborated in Garmon. In Garner the Court expressed its
rationale in the following manner:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced
by any tribunal competent to apply laws generally to the parties. It went
on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific
and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for
investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including
judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules to avoid
those diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tri48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 304.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 158 (b), amending 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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bunals and a diversity of procedures are quite apt to produce incompatible
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law. The
same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from intervening in such cases,
except by way of review of an application of the Federal Board, precludes
state courts from doing so.53
This reasoning was reiterated in Garmon and later reaffirmed in Lockridge.
One of the problems with the preemption doctrine is that the Court has never
made a serious attempt "to discover whether particular sanctions imposed by
state courts under particular circumstances would interfere with the federal
program." 4 Preemption may indeed be "designed to shield the system from
conflicting regulation of conduct" 5 by emphasis on the conduct regulated rather
than on the remedy provided; but in effect, as it applies to individual union
members, the inequities often outweigh the possibilities of conflict. Rarely are
the individual union members given access to the state courts. Individual interests which are of concern to the state, as for example the enforcement of a
contract between a member and his union are unprotected simply because as a
procedural matter it is impossible for a state to acquire the necessary determination that the case is an appropriate one for state adjudication." Before enactment of the LMRA, states regulated unprotected union activity. 7 In light of this
state regulation, it is unlikely that Congress would have attempted to completely
preempt it without explicitly saying so. Congressman Hartley, the co-sponsor of
the NLRA, was aware of the need to preserve state regulation, as is evidenced
by the following dialogue:
Mr. Kersten: Wisconsin and other states have their own labor relations
laws. We are very anxious that disputes be settled at the State level in so
far as it is possible. Can the gentleman give us assurance in that proposition... that that is the sense of the language of the report?
Mr. Hartley: That is the sense of the language of the bill and the report.
That is my interpretation of the bill, that this will not interfere with the
State of Wisconsin in the administration of its own laws. In other words,
this will not interfere with the validity of the laws within that state.
Mr. Kersten: And it will permit as many of these disputes to be settled at
the State level as possible?
Mr. Hartly: Exactly.5 8
It appears that the LMRA sought to protect the equilibrium between state
and federal regulation. Under the preemption doctrine, even where the NLRB
cannot provide complete relief to an aggrieved party, the state may not act where
the conduct is "arguably" protected or prohibited by the Act. As an example,
the Board under section 10(c) can order reinstatement and back pay, but it
53 Id. at 490.
54 Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv. L. REv.
641, 648 (1961).
55 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971).
56 Michelman, supra note 54, at 650.
57 See, e.g., People ex rel. Deverell v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 118 N.Y. 101, 23
N.E. 129 (1889) (expulsion); Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891) (suspension of local).
58 93 CONG. REc. 6383-84 (1947) (remarks of Congressmen Kersten and Hartley).

[Vol. 47:1009]

NOTES

cannot order the union to reinstate a member arbitrarily expelled." Reinstatement in the union may be the key to one's livelihood in this age of vast expanding
unionism. The NLRB cannot award damages for mental or physical suffering,
but the state courts can under local laws of contracts and damages. 0
The preemption doctrine emphasizes the possibility of some entanglement
with the Board's enforcement of national policy and ignores the possibility of
an unjustly ousted union member left without a remedy. While it is true that
punitive damages and criminal penalties are likely to have a regulatory effect on
conduct within the Board's jurisdiction, it does not follow that the award of
compensatory damages, for injuries resulting from conduct that is "arguably"
an unfair labor practice, will produce substantial conflict or have a regulatory
effect on conduct within the Board's competence. If state courts were permitted
to apply federal law and were limited to application of those remedies open to
the Board, the likelihood of conflict would be minimal and a more equitable
balance would be struck between individual rights and the need for a uniform
national labor policy.
In Lockridge, the Court emphasized that the "crux" of the complaint did
not involve a "purely internal union affair."61 However, it is rare that a dispute
between a member and his union will involve a "purely internal union affair."
An analysis of the Court's rationale reveals that their emphasis may be misplaced. In Gonzales, the union breached its contract by expulsion of a member
and the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the state court because of the possibility
a member might be left without a remedy. The Court felt "potential conflict
[was] too contingent, too remotely related to the public interest expressed in the
Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving state courts of jurisdiction to vindicate
the personal rights of an ousted union member.""1 Because of his expulsion,
Gonzales was unable to obtain employment. The end result in Lockridge is
essentially the same. A member was suspended from his union and his job was
terminated. The difference was that Lockridge was unable to bring a suit in
state court. The Court acknowledged that he could have brought a civil suit
to enforce the collective bargaining agreement between his employer and the
union even if "the conduct alleged was arguably protected or prohibited by the
National Labor Relations Act." 3 This would be permissible "because the history
of the enactment of section 301 reveals that Congress deliberately chose to leave
the enforcement of collective agreements to the usual process of law." 4 The
possibility of conflict between the courts and the NLRB is also present in the
use of a section 301 suit but the Court has held that the state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.6 5 Section 3016" has been inter59

See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964).

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See, e.g., Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958).
403 U.S. at 296.
356 U.S. at 621.
403 U.S. at 298.
Id.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
The Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
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preted by the Court to permit state courts to assert jurisdiction in order to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. 7 There appears to be an inconsistency in
permitting state courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements, even where
there is "arguably" an unfair labor practice, but to deny the states jurisdiction
in enforcing contracts between a member and his union. In Vaca v. Sipes, the
Court held:
The federal labor laws seek to promote industrial peace and the improvement of ways and working conditions by fostering a system of employee organization and collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
system as encouraged by Congress and administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective
interests of all employees in a bargaining unit ....
The duty of fair representation has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against
individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of
federal labor law. Were we to hold ... that the courts are foreclosed ...
from this traditional supervisory jurisdiction, the individual employee injured by arbitrary or discriminatory union conduct could no longer be assured of impartial review of his complaint, since the Board's General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint. The existence of even a small group of cases in which the Board
would be unwilling or unable to remedy a union's breach of duty would
further frustrate the basic purposes underlying the duty of fair representation
doctrine. For these reasons, we cannot assume from the NLRB's tardy
assumption of jurisdiction in these cases that Congress, when it enacted
NLRA § 8(b) in 1947, intended to oust the courts of their traditional
jurisdiction to curb arbitrary conduct by the individual employee's statutory
representative."
It appears that the Court, rather than Congress, has ousted the state courts
of their traditional jurisdiction. Garmon involved a union-employee dispute. To
extend the preemption doctrine to an individual employee who seeks to redress
his grievance against his union is to deny the courts their traditional jurisdiction.
Many state courts have held that membership in a labor union constitutes a contract between the union and member.6 9 Traditionally the state courts have protected disciplined members through the contract theory. The rationale of this
theory is that a member, by joining a union, enters into a contract, the terms of
which are expressed in the union constitution and by-laws. Theoretically the
member consents to expulsion or suspension according to the provisions of the
contract, and if he is disciplined in violation of the union constitution or bylaws, the court can order his reinstatement.
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) . . . Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.
67 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
68 Id. at 182-183.
69 See, e.g., Bales v. Journeymen Barbers', Etc., 239 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1970); Lockridge v.
Amalgamated Ass'n of S., E.R. & M.C. Emp., 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d. 719 (1969); West
Virginia Pulp and Paper Co. v. Lewis, 17 Misc. 2d 94, 191 N.Y.S.2d. 303 (1958), aff'd 8
App. Div. 2d. 899, 187 N.Y.S. 2d. 1002 (1959); Taxicab Drivers' Local Union No. 889 v.
Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1957).
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NOTES

The contract theory is a legal fiction and it has its problems. For example,
some courts have held that the contract is with the member and union"° but in
some states the union may not be a legal entity. Some courts have attempted to
bypass the problem by holding that the contract is with the other members. 1
However, this second theory may be unrealistic where union membership numbers in the thousands. Union membership is a complex host of rights and duties
and is a special relationship which may be far removed from the traditional approach of contract law. Nevertheless, the imperfections of the contract theory
do not outweigh the alternative of no remedy for the individual union member.
If the court is willing to extend the use of section 301 suits to state courts in
order to curb arbitrary conduct by unions, despite the possibility of conflict with
the (NLR.B, it would seem that it can also sanction suits for breach of union contracts. The Court held in Dowd Box Co. u. Courtney that state courts still retain
jurisdiction to enforce contracts made by labor organizations.7 2 It stated:
The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of § 301 (a) was
not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement
of contracts made by labor organizations. Moreover, there is explicit evidence that Congress intended not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction
of state courts.7

In the interests of a uniform national labor law, the Court has required
state courts to apply federal law in section 301 suits. 4 It is wooden logic to suggest that state courts are capable of applying federal law in suits involving the
enforcement of arbitration or collective bargaining agreements but that the
same state courts are incapable of applying federal law in suits which involve a
breach of contract between a union and a member. The Supreme Court's rationale in Dowd Box.Co. v. Courtne 5 appears to be in harmony with Justice White's
view "that the perceived interests in judicial adjudication of contractual disputes
is more important than the interests of uniformity that would be promoted by
preemption."7 In Lockridge, Justice White stated:
EIThe 'rule' of uniformity that the Court invokes today is at best a
tattered one, and at worst little more than a myth. In the name of national labor policy, parties are encouraged by the Board, by Congress, and by
this Court to seek other forums if the unfair labor practice arises in an arbitrable dispute, violates the collective bargaining agreement, or otherwise
qualifies as one of the exceptions.... Until today, Machinists v. Gonzales
had been thought to stand for the proposition that Garmon did not reach
cases 'where the possibility of conflict with federal policy is... remote' ...
I see no reason why this exception has not, for all practical purposes,
expired. 77
70 See Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 281-82, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
71 Elfer v. Maine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934); State
ex rel. Dane v. Le Fevre, 251 Wise. 146, 28 N.W.2d. 349 (1947).
72 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
73 Id. at 508.
74 Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
75 368 U.S. 402 (1962).
76 Motor Coach Employees v.Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 314 (1971) (White, J., dissent-

ing).
77

Id. at 318-19.
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The Labor Management Relations Act through sections 8(a) (3) and
8 (b) (2) attempted to furnish limited protection for disciplined union members.7
These sections essentially protect the right to work. If an expelled union member
is discharged, the Board may prosecute his case and he can obtain back pay
either from the union, or from the employer if there has been a § 8(a) (3) violation. However, because of the backlog of work, it may be months before the
Board will act7" and the lack of interim relief may make the delay intolerable.
State courts can provide a remedy for the disciplined member but the preemption
doctrine forecloses this relief. The Gonzales case and the other Court-made and
Congressional-made exceptions to the preemption doctrine provided an opportunity for relief to the individual member, but the Supreme Court has narrowly
limited the exceptions to the detriment of the union member.
V. Suggested Solutions
The solution to the problems created by the Court's Garmon doctrine can
come from either the Court or the Congress. The Court has itself noted that
the Garmon doctrine is not without imperfection" but has suggested that it will
be continued to be applied unless altered by Congress. Before suggesting a proposed amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, the possibility of the
Court solving its own created dilemma should be further explored. The question
still remains whether Congress intended to federalize the whole area of labor
relations. It is apparent from the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 8 ' that Congress did not attempt to preempt traditional
state remedies. It was not until the passage of the LMRDA that Congress directed its attention primarily to union-member relations. Title I of the LMRDA 2
provides a Bill of Rights for union members which purports to give them equal
rights and privileges to nominate candidates, to vote in elections, to attend membership meetings, to express freely any views and the right to institute suit against
the union. Congress did not make the Board the arbitrator of these rights but
provided for civil enforcement in the federal courts.8 "
It should be noted that Senator John F. Kennedy, one of the sponsors of the
bill, imposed the inclusion of the Bill of Rights because he felt that union mere78 The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3), (b) (3) (1964),
provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
79 See THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1970, supra note 46.

80
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Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302 (1971).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964).
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bers were provided with those rights more satisfactorily byexisting state law and
by the Taft-Hartley Act.84 Senator Kennedy understood Title I to raise the
question of preemption which he feared might wipe out the common law remedies of the various states and then only those rights contained in Title I would be

available to union members. The response to Senator Kennedy's concern was
the adoption of section 603 (a)8 5 which expressly retained state rights and

remedies.
In light of Congressional intent not to deprive members of state remedies,
perhaps the Court should attempt to reach an accommodation between the
LMRDA and the Garmon doctrine in order to provide a more efficacious remedy
for individual members. The language of section 603 (a) explicitly retains the
existing rights of members under state law. There appears to be an incompatibility between section 603 (a) and the Court's application of the preemption doc-

trine. Justice White took notice of this incompatibility when he stated:
Beyond any doubt whatever, although Congress directly imposed some far
reaching federal prohibitions on union conduct, it specifically denied any
preemption of rights or remedies created by either state law or union constitutions and by-laws. Thus, as to union member relations, any parallel
rights created by the State, either directly or indirectly through enforcement
of union constitutions or by-laws, were to stand at full strength. s

Section 102 of the LMRDA provides that a union member who charges
that his union has violated his rights under Title I of the Act may bring a civil

action in a United States district court for appropriate relief.8 7 The language of
section 102 clearly indicates that the cause of action must arise under the provisions of the Act. However, even where the cause of action might involve an

unfair labor practice, the courts are not preempted by the NLRB jurisdiction
because the section specifically allows suits in the federal courts. In Boilermakers

v. Hardeman" a member alleged unlawful expulsion under section 101 (a) (5)89
84
85

105 CONG. REc. 6482 (1959) (remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy).
29 U.S.C. § 523 (1964), provides:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or
limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or any officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a labor organization, or of any trust in which a labor
organization is interested, under any other Federal law or under the laws of any
State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter
shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal law or law of any State.

86
87

Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 322 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964), provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been
infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district
court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.
401 U.S. 233 (1971).
29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (5) (1964) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing.

88
89

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April, 1972]

of the LMRDA but sought only damages for wrongful expulsion, consisting of
loss of income, loss of pension and insurance rights, mental anguish and punitive
damages, rather than reinstatement. The Court held that the critical issue in
Hardeman's complaint was a union denial of a full and fair hearing within the
meaning of section 101 (a) (5). Despite the type of damages which Hardeman
sought, the Court held that the "claim was not within the exclusive competence
of the National Labor Relations Board."9 As previously stated, Congress did
not attempt to preempt traditional state remedies with the enactment of the
LMRDA. Section 102 provides that a member may bring a civil action in the
federal district court. When this is viewed along with section 603, which explicitly retains state rights and remedies, it appears that Congress did not foreclose
the possibility of bringing an action for breach of a union contract or unlawful
expulsion in the state courts.
If the Court is unwilling to accept this accommodation, then Congressional
action is necessary. Since it has been generally accepted by the courts that the
discretion of the General Counsel is unreviewable,9" Congress should amend
section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act.92 This section should be
amended to divest the General Counsel of his final authority in the investigation
of charges and issuance of complaints. It has been generally recognized that law
enforcement, or the decision to prosecute, is not subject to judicial review at the
suit of interested parties. This can be justified on the ground that enforcement
or prosecution is a function of intangibles over and above the purely legal considerations, such as staff limitations, backlogs, time factors or other tactical considerations. However, the private parties usually have other remedies. For
example, if a prosecutor refuses to prosecute an assault charge, a civil suit is
available to the victim. This is not true under the National Labor Relations
Board procedure. When the General Counsel refuses to issue a complaint, there
is no alternative protection, at least of the employee interest, under the National
Labor Relations Act. This absolute discretion can have drastic and extraordinary
consequences for the employee. Justice Douglas summarizes the problem in this
manner:
When the basic dispute is between a union and an employer, any hiatus
that might exist in the jurisdictional balance that has been struck can be
filled by resort to economic power. But when the union 93member has a dispute with his union, he has no power on which to rely.
Professor Jaffe, speaking in favor of mandatory jurisdiction, noted "the
point that the claim of the individual to enforce somewhere in some way what is
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401 U.S. at 238.
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See United Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 738, aff'd per curiam,

366 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
92 29 U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1964) provides in part: "[Hie [General Counsel] shall have
final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance
of complaints . . ."
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Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 700 (1963)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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apprehended psychologically as a right is an important claim....,,4 Jaffe states
further:
[N]ormally the courts should tolerate agency law making which does not
in the courts' opinion seem clearly contrary to the statutory purposes as the
courts understand them. But the statute under which an agency operates
is not the whole law applicable to its operation. An agency is not an island
entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent mansion of
of the law. The very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is
intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into
harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found in the statute
at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the
'common law' and the ultimate guarantees associated with the constitution. 5
An amendment to section 3(d) would at least afford the individual his day
in court. However, this is not the most efficacious remedy because of the expense
and time involved in exhaustion of the administrative remedy. Congress should
also amend section 14(c) (2) of the NLRA.9" This section permits the states to
assert jurisdiction over labor disputes in which the Board declines to assert jurisdiction. It is proposed that section 14(c) (2) be amended to read as follows:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction or where the General
Counsel fails to issue a complaint on behalf of a union member who has
alleged the commission of an arguably unfair labor practice or alleges arbitrary suspension or expulsion from any labor organization.

Essentially, what the above amendment does is to permit the state courts
to assert jurisdiction only where the General Counsel has failed to issue a complaint. The thrust of the amendment is to provide an ousted union member an
opportunity for a hearing. The jurisdiction of the Board is not bypassed because
the aggrieved member must first go to the Board to file his grievance. When the
General Counsel refuses to issue a complaint because of the merits of the plaintiff's cause then the plaintiff may go to the state courts for hearing. The proposed
amendment in no way undermines the vitality of the preemption doctrine.
VI.

Conclusion

The Garmon doctrine has definitely promoted uniformity in the administration of the federal regulatory scheme, but in doing so it has created some serious
difficulties. Under the preemption doctrine, there is no device or procedural
safeguard to ensure that a grievance will be adjudicated. When conduct is
"arguably" protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act, the
94 Taffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IowA L. REv. 485,
531 (1940).
95 L. Jaffe, JuDIcrAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (abr. ed. 1965).
96 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c) (2) (1964).
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states cannot assert jurisdiction and the aggrieved party must bring his dispute
before the National Labor Relations Board. However, the Board may refuse
to assert jurisdiction, the General Counsel may refuse to issue a complaint or the
Board may not define the status of the dispute "with unclouded legal significance." 97 Lockridge makes this situation all the more apparent-even if the
General Counsel had refused to issue a complaint, the Idaho state court could
not assert its jurisdiction. The Court demonstrated its sensitivity to the possibility
of a member left without a remedy in Vaca v. Sipes and held that in cases involving arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, an individual could go to the state
court.9 This was permitted despite the fact that an unfair labor practice might
be involved. While it is true that the issue in Vaca was a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation, the Court recognized that the state courts traditionally
exercised jurisdiction in this area. The state courts have also traditionally exercised jurisdiction in the area of union-member relations. To deny this traditional
jurisdiction after the General Counsel has refused to issue a complaint is to deny
a member a remedy. It is not suggested that the Court eviscerate the Garmon
doctrine. The exceptions to the preemption doctrine have not undermined the
national uniformity which Congress sought to establish through enactment of
the federal labor laws. A continuation of the Gonzales exception would have
minimal effect on national uniformity. This de minimis effect would be greatly
outweighed by the benefit to the individual union member.
James E. Farrell,Jr.
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San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).

